Stores: seal the GOG, Epic and Amazon sign-in files with an Android Keystore key (#486)

The stores' sign-ins (files/stores/<store>/credentials.json: access and refresh
tokens, account id and name) were plain JSON. Other apps could not read them, but
every program in the Linux session runs as the app and could. They are now sealed
with AES-256-GCM under a non-exportable AndroidKeyStore key (StrongBox when the
device has one), so the session only ever sees ciphertext.

- Format: a versioned envelope {v, alg, iv, ct}, written atomically and readable
  only by the app. No new dependencies (javax.crypto and KeyStore).
- Migration: an existing plaintext file is sealed at the next start, checked by
  decrypting it, then the plaintext is removed; users stay signed in.
- No Keystore on the device: the file stays plain and the log says so once per
  start.
- A sealed file that can never be opened (tampered, key gone or invalidated,
  broken envelope) is removed and that store asks for sign-in again. A transient
  Keystore error keeps the file and retries.
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The412Banner authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-09 14:42:23 -04:00
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@@ -189,5 +189,37 @@ Store log lines (the engines' included) go through `StoresState.logLine`, which
(`StoreLogFiles`: one file a day, seven days kept, ~2 MB each before it rolls to `.1`). Nothing
shows them in the app; the session's Share logs zip carries them under `stores/`.
Credentials live in `filesDir/stores/<store>/credentials.json` only (`StoreAccounts`); store URLs
are logged through `StoreLog.redactUrl`, which drops the query string where the signed tokens live.
Store URLs are logged through `StoreLog.redactUrl`, which drops the query string where the signed
tokens live.
## Security
- **Sign-ins:** `filesDir/stores/<store>/credentials.json` only, read and written through
`StoreAccounts` alone (`GogAuth`, `EpicCredentialStore`, `AmazonCredentialStore`, cloud saves
all call it). The file is an envelope `{"v":1,"alg":"AES/GCM","iv":...,"ct":...}` (base64):
AES-256-GCM (`CredentialCipher`) under a key generated in the AndroidKeyStore (alias
`droiddeck-store-credentials`; encrypt/decrypt, GCM, no padding, not exportable, no user
authentication so background downloads and launch-time exchange codes work with the screen off;
StrongBox where present, else the TEE). Written through a temp file and a rename, mode 600.
- **Earlier plain files:** sealed at app start (`StoreAccounts.encryptAll`, and on any read),
verified by opening the result, the plain file replaced; the log says
`stores: credentials encrypted <store>`. A plain `.tmp` left by an older build is deleted.
- **No Keystore** (some ROMs): the file stays plain, the log says
`stores: keystore unavailable, credentials stay plain (<exception class>)` once, and the next
start tries again.
- **A file that can never open** - it does not authenticate (`AEADBadTagException`: tampered, or
another key after data was cleared or a backup restored on another device), the key is
permanently invalidated or gone from the Keystore, or it is not an envelope: deleted, and the
store reads as signed out, so its sign-in card shows.
- **A failure that may pass** (`KeyStoreException`, `ProviderException`, any other
`InvalidKeyException`, an I/O error, StrongBox busy): the file is kept, the store stays signed in
(no sign-in card) and is marked unavailable (`StoreAccounts.isUnavailable`), a store action shows
`<Store> sign-in could not be read: try again.`, the log says
`stores: credentials unreadable this start (<exception class>)` once, and the next access tries
again.
- **The Linux session:** the app's files directory is bound into every session, so the guest can
see `credentials.json` - as the envelope only; the key never leaves the Keystore. Nothing in the
guest reads the files: `droiddeck-store-launch` asks the app over `<session>/stores/req|resp`
for an Epic exchange code, which the app writes beside the game's launcher; the launcher reads
it into a variable and deletes it before the game starts (single use, expires in minutes).
Steam's own client files are outside this.
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@@ -7,6 +7,26 @@ the timeline, then lessons and backlog. Companion to the README (what the app *d
---
## 2026-10-09 - `feat/store-credentials-keystore`: store sign-ins sealed with the Android Keystore
- **What:** `filesDir/stores/<store>/credentials.json` (GOG, Epic, Amazon: tokens, ids, names,
expiry) is now an AES-256-GCM envelope (`{"v":1,"alg":"AES/GCM","iv","ct"}`) under a
non-exportable AndroidKeyStore key (StrongBox if present, else TEE; no user authentication).
`StoreAccounts` is the one layer; `CredentialCipher` holds the envelope and the key.
- **Upgrade:** a plain file is sealed at the first start (verified, then replaced); users stay
signed in. Log: `stores: credentials encrypted <store>`.
- **Fallbacks:** no Keystore - stays plain, logged once, retried next start. A file that can never
open (bad tag, key invalidated or missing, not an envelope) - deleted, signed out (sign-in card).
Any other Keystore or I/O failure - file kept, store stays signed in but unavailable (actions show
`<Store> sign-in could not be read: try again.`), logged once, retried on the next access. Never
a crash.
- **Session:** the guest sees the envelope only; it never read the files (the Epic code comes over
the request channel, written beside the launcher and deleted by it).
- **Tests:** `StoreAccountsCipherTest` (round trip, sealed on disk, migration of all three stores,
tampered file, lost key, key missing, garbage, no-Keystore fallback then sealed next start,
transient Keystore / I/O failures keep the file and a later read succeeds, sign-out). Not yet
on a device.
## 2026-10-08 - `feat/private-logs`: every log in app-private storage, shared as one scrubbed zip
- **Where logs live:** `files/logs/` (`LinuxRuntime.logDir`), nothing under `Download/DroidDeck`