// Runs a program under a seccomp filter that answers the system calls Android's app policy blocks // with SIGSYS, the way a stock app process does, for testing on builds that have no filter: // seccomp-sim [-a NR,NR...] PROGRAM [ARGS...] // seccomp-sim -f FILTER PROGRAM [ARGS...] // -a leaves the listed system calls allowed (to find which one kills a program). -f installs a // filter as it is (raw struct sock_filter entries), such as the app filter a device's zygote makes. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static const int blocked[] = {99, 100, 97, 217, 218, 219, 268, 277, 280, 293, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 159}; #define MAX_ALLOWED 64 #define NBLOCKED (sizeof(blocked) / sizeof(blocked[0])) static int run_filter_file(const char *path, char **argv) { static struct sock_filter filter[BPF_MAXINSNS]; FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb"); if (!f) { perror("seccomp-sim: -f"); return 2; } size_t n = fread(filter, sizeof(filter[0]), BPF_MAXINSNS, f); int extra = fgetc(f) != EOF; fclose(f); if (n == 0 || extra) { fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: %s holds no filter of at most %d instructions\n", path, BPF_MAXINSNS); return 2; } struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter }; if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) { perror("seccomp-sim"); return 1; } execv(argv[0], argv); perror("seccomp-sim: exec"); return 127; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-f") == 0) return run_filter_file(argv[2], argv + 3); int skip[MAX_ALLOWED], nskip = 0, arg = 1; if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-a") == 0) { for (char *p = argv[2];; p++) { char *end = NULL; long nr = strtol(p, &end, 10); if (end == p || (*end != '\0' && *end != ',') || *p < '0' || *p > '9' || nr < 0 || nr > 1023 || nskip == MAX_ALLOWED) { fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: -a takes up to %d comma-separated system call numbers, not \"%s\"\n", MAX_ALLOWED, argv[2]); return 2; } skip[nskip++] = (int)nr; if (*end == '\0') break; p = end; } arg = 3; } if (arg >= argc) return 2; struct sock_filter filter[4 + 2 * MAX_ALLOWED + 2 + 2 * NBLOCKED + 1]; int n = 0; filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 1, 0); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)); for (int i = 0; i < nskip; i++) { filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, skip[i], 0, 1); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW); } filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K, 424, 0, 1); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP); for (size_t i = 0; i < NBLOCKED; i++) { filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, blocked[i], 0, 1); filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP); } filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW); struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter }; if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) { perror("seccomp-sim"); return 1; } execv(argv[arg], argv + arg); perror("seccomp-sim: exec"); return 127; }