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https://github.com/Droid-Deck/DroidDeck.git
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* feat: experimental native userland that runs the Linux side without proot * fix(native): keep the visible name of link2symlink binaries * fix(ci): run the native hook build through bash * fix(native): address review findings in the hook and the ctl fallback * fix(ctl): use the broadcast fallback only when content is missing * fix(native): survive Android's seccomp filter in ld.so, libc and posix_spawn children * docs(native): how to test under Android's seccomp filter * fix(session): hide an unlistable /sys/bus/pci/devices so libpci does not abort Chromium's GPU init * fix(native): nested syscall() redirects no longer loop with libblsession's openat2 * fix(native): controllers reach Steam and the install-script evaluator no longer blocks game moves * fix(native): write the hook's NUL character literals as escapes * fix(native): proot fast path turns off and greys out while running without proot * fix(native): D-Bus logins work and Xwayland still admits root once peers read as root * fix(native): scripts on session mounts outside the rootfs run with the rootfs shell * fix(native): games on the SD card library start in their own folder * fix(native): Wine drive links proot made point at their real places * fix(native): at-calls, uid lookups and relative programs follow the session's mounts * fix(native): close-from in spawned programs covers what is open at the spawn * fix(native): service names resolve and the DNS fallback answers what was asked * build(native): the hook is built with its Go support and tracked by the preload recipe * fix(native): drive links into identity mounts stay, and relink and seccomp patch failures are logged * fix(native): seccomp-sim's filter holds every allowed call * fix(ctl): the broadcast fallback only stands in for a missing content command * fix(native): pre-2.33 glibc stat calls present owners as root too * fix(native): res_init and res_ninit call glibc, so Steam's store resolves names * fix(ci): a preload lock older than a new output rebuilds that group, and generated headers are not hashed * fix(native): a second seccomp patch run leaves other system calls alone * fix(native): the terminal and bottom desktop keep proot's environment in a native session * fix(native): any number of session mounts, and openat2 relative to a mounted folder * fix(agent): a native command's stdin is written beside its timeout * fix(ctl): native rejects --env without = and timeouts outside 0-600 s * fix(native): the resolver fallback has the network's IPv6 servers, and lookups keep the fallback's validation errors * fix(native): a spawn whose dup2 source close-from closed fails with EBADF * fix(native): __getcwd_chk checks its buffer, and seccomp-sim -a takes only call numbers * feat(native): guests see the session hostname from uname and gethostname * feat(native): the terminal and bottom desktop run without proot * fix(components): an origin APK without a newer preload output still proves the rest * fix(native): seccomp-sim -a rejects empty fields * fix(native): gethostbyname no longer answers failed lookups with Ubuntu and Debian addresses * feat(native): store installers, root helpers, Comet and Xodus run without proot * fix(native): the hook finds libraries, preloads and itself through a sandbox's mounts, and ldconfig -C makes its cache * feat(native): Flatpak sandboxes run without proot, and apply_extra runs without a runtime * fix(native): remove, glob and nftw take guest paths, and links in a mount are followed as the guest sees them * fix(native): Flatpak sandboxes get the session's mounts, their libraries' RUNPATHs, and no rootfs-only settings * fix(native): gethostbyname asks the network's DNS servers, nftw of / gives single slashes, and the library path fits mapped directories * fix(native): a native process starts in its working directory's real place * fix(native): the library path given to ld.so holds whole directories only * fix(native): Wine drive links keep their guest paths, so proot finds the library after a native session * fix(native): droiddeckctl native prepares the rootfs with the setting off * fix(native): a SysV segment stays while any process has it attached * fix(native): DNS lookups ask the network's own servers before public ones * fix(native): a program's own seccomp traps reach its own SIGSYS handler * feat(native): run native sessions under a device's own app seccomp filter for testing * fix(native): SysV attaches and collection take a lock, a failed mark fails the attach, and collection closes its directory * fix(native): shmat fails when it cannot take the segment lock * fix(native): the SysV segment lock is retried when a signal interrupts it * fix(native): process tools see the session's processes as root's * fix(native): native processes are named after their program, not ld.so * fix(native): a session's helpers keep the mode the session started in * fix(native): a keyed SysV segment stays until IPC_RMID * fix(native): a rootfs link to an absolute guest path is followed in the guest, so Wine finds its z: drive * fix(native): a sandbox whose loader can't be patched runs under proot * fix(native): creating a private SysV segment also collects stale ones * fix(native): a session stopped during startup forgets its mode * fix(xbox): a native backend is authorized by its process ancestry * fix(native): Wine's drive links are followed in the guest from any prefix * fix(native): only the startup that owns the running session publishes its mode * fix(native): a SysV segment stays until IPC_RMID even after its maker ends * fix(native): a sandbox mount nested in another mount gets its own place * fix(native): a sandbox whose mount places can't be made runs under proot
93 lines
4.0 KiB
C
93 lines
4.0 KiB
C
// Runs a program under a seccomp filter that answers the system calls Android's app policy blocks
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// with SIGSYS, the way a stock app process does, for testing on builds that have no filter:
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// seccomp-sim [-a NR,NR...] PROGRAM [ARGS...]
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// seccomp-sim -f FILTER PROGRAM [ARGS...]
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// -a leaves the listed system calls allowed (to find which one kills a program). -f installs a
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// filter as it is (raw struct sock_filter entries), such as the app filter a device's zygote makes.
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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static const int blocked[] = {99, 100, 97, 217, 218, 219, 268, 277, 280, 293, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 159};
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#define MAX_ALLOWED 64
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#define NBLOCKED (sizeof(blocked) / sizeof(blocked[0]))
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static int run_filter_file(const char *path, char **argv) {
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static struct sock_filter filter[BPF_MAXINSNS];
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FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
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if (!f) {
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perror("seccomp-sim: -f");
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return 2;
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}
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size_t n = fread(filter, sizeof(filter[0]), BPF_MAXINSNS, f);
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int extra = fgetc(f) != EOF;
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fclose(f);
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if (n == 0 || extra) {
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fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: %s holds no filter of at most %d instructions\n", path, BPF_MAXINSNS);
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return 2;
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}
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struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter };
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if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
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perror("seccomp-sim");
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return 1;
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}
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execv(argv[0], argv);
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perror("seccomp-sim: exec");
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return 127;
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}
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int main(int argc, char **argv) {
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if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-f") == 0) return run_filter_file(argv[2], argv + 3);
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int skip[MAX_ALLOWED], nskip = 0, arg = 1;
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if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-a") == 0) {
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for (char *p = argv[2];; p++) {
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char *end = NULL;
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long nr = strtol(p, &end, 10);
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if (end == p || (*end != '\0' && *end != ',') || *p < '0' || *p > '9' ||
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nr < 0 || nr > 1023 || nskip == MAX_ALLOWED) {
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fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: -a takes up to %d comma-separated system call numbers, not \"%s\"\n", MAX_ALLOWED, argv[2]);
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return 2;
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}
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skip[nskip++] = (int)nr;
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if (*end == '\0') break;
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p = end;
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}
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arg = 3;
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}
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if (arg >= argc) return 2;
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struct sock_filter filter[4 + 2 * MAX_ALLOWED + 2 + 2 * NBLOCKED + 1];
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int n = 0;
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch));
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 1, 0);
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr));
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for (int i = 0; i < nskip; i++) {
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, skip[i], 0, 1);
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
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}
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K, 424, 0, 1);
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < NBLOCKED; i++) {
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, blocked[i], 0, 1);
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP);
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}
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filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
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struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter };
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if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
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perror("seccomp-sim");
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return 1;
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}
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execv(argv[arg], argv + arg);
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perror("seccomp-sim: exec");
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return 127;
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}
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