Files
DroidDeck/tools/nativeguest/seccomp-sim.c
T
Kurt Himebauch 2848484a99 feat: fuck proot and proots mama (#2300)
* feat: experimental native userland that runs the Linux side without proot

* fix(native): keep the visible name of link2symlink binaries

* fix(ci): run the native hook build through bash

* fix(native): address review findings in the hook and the ctl fallback

* fix(ctl): use the broadcast fallback only when content is missing

* fix(native): survive Android's seccomp filter in ld.so, libc and posix_spawn children

* docs(native): how to test under Android's seccomp filter

* fix(session): hide an unlistable /sys/bus/pci/devices so libpci does not abort Chromium's GPU init

* fix(native): nested syscall() redirects no longer loop with libblsession's openat2

* fix(native): controllers reach Steam and the install-script evaluator no longer blocks game moves

* fix(native): write the hook's NUL character literals as escapes

* fix(native): proot fast path turns off and greys out while running without proot

* fix(native): D-Bus logins work and Xwayland still admits root once peers read as root

* fix(native): scripts on session mounts outside the rootfs run with the rootfs shell

* fix(native): games on the SD card library start in their own folder

* fix(native): Wine drive links proot made point at their real places

* fix(native): at-calls, uid lookups and relative programs follow the session's mounts

* fix(native): close-from in spawned programs covers what is open at the spawn

* fix(native): service names resolve and the DNS fallback answers what was asked

* build(native): the hook is built with its Go support and tracked by the preload recipe

* fix(native): drive links into identity mounts stay, and relink and seccomp patch failures are logged

* fix(native): seccomp-sim's filter holds every allowed call

* fix(ctl): the broadcast fallback only stands in for a missing content command

* fix(native): pre-2.33 glibc stat calls present owners as root too

* fix(native): res_init and res_ninit call glibc, so Steam's store resolves names

* fix(ci): a preload lock older than a new output rebuilds that group, and generated headers are not hashed

* fix(native): a second seccomp patch run leaves other system calls alone

* fix(native): the terminal and bottom desktop keep proot's environment in a native session

* fix(native): any number of session mounts, and openat2 relative to a mounted folder

* fix(agent): a native command's stdin is written beside its timeout

* fix(ctl): native rejects --env without = and timeouts outside 0-600 s

* fix(native): the resolver fallback has the network's IPv6 servers, and lookups keep the fallback's validation errors

* fix(native): a spawn whose dup2 source close-from closed fails with EBADF

* fix(native): __getcwd_chk checks its buffer, and seccomp-sim -a takes only call numbers

* feat(native): guests see the session hostname from uname and gethostname

* feat(native): the terminal and bottom desktop run without proot

* fix(components): an origin APK without a newer preload output still proves the rest

* fix(native): seccomp-sim -a rejects empty fields

* fix(native): gethostbyname no longer answers failed lookups with Ubuntu and Debian addresses

* feat(native): store installers, root helpers, Comet and Xodus run without proot

* fix(native): the hook finds libraries, preloads and itself through a sandbox's mounts, and ldconfig -C makes its cache

* feat(native): Flatpak sandboxes run without proot, and apply_extra runs without a runtime

* fix(native): remove, glob and nftw take guest paths, and links in a mount are followed as the guest sees them

* fix(native): Flatpak sandboxes get the session's mounts, their libraries' RUNPATHs, and no rootfs-only settings

* fix(native): gethostbyname asks the network's DNS servers, nftw of / gives single slashes, and the library path fits mapped directories

* fix(native): a native process starts in its working directory's real place

* fix(native): the library path given to ld.so holds whole directories only

* fix(native): Wine drive links keep their guest paths, so proot finds the library after a native session

* fix(native): droiddeckctl native prepares the rootfs with the setting off

* fix(native): a SysV segment stays while any process has it attached

* fix(native): DNS lookups ask the network's own servers before public ones

* fix(native): a program's own seccomp traps reach its own SIGSYS handler

* feat(native): run native sessions under a device's own app seccomp filter for testing

* fix(native): SysV attaches and collection take a lock, a failed mark fails the attach, and collection closes its directory

* fix(native): shmat fails when it cannot take the segment lock

* fix(native): the SysV segment lock is retried when a signal interrupts it

* fix(native): process tools see the session's processes as root's

* fix(native): native processes are named after their program, not ld.so

* fix(native): a session's helpers keep the mode the session started in

* fix(native): a keyed SysV segment stays until IPC_RMID

* fix(native): a rootfs link to an absolute guest path is followed in the guest, so Wine finds its z: drive

* fix(native): a sandbox whose loader can't be patched runs under proot

* fix(native): creating a private SysV segment also collects stale ones

* fix(native): a session stopped during startup forgets its mode

* fix(xbox): a native backend is authorized by its process ancestry

* fix(native): Wine's drive links are followed in the guest from any prefix

* fix(native): only the startup that owns the running session publishes its mode

* fix(native): a SysV segment stays until IPC_RMID even after its maker ends

* fix(native): a sandbox mount nested in another mount gets its own place

* fix(native): a sandbox whose mount places can't be made runs under proot
2026-11-11 09:13:17 -05:00

93 lines
4.0 KiB
C

// Runs a program under a seccomp filter that answers the system calls Android's app policy blocks
// with SIGSYS, the way a stock app process does, for testing on builds that have no filter:
// seccomp-sim [-a NR,NR...] PROGRAM [ARGS...]
// seccomp-sim -f FILTER PROGRAM [ARGS...]
// -a leaves the listed system calls allowed (to find which one kills a program). -f installs a
// filter as it is (raw struct sock_filter entries), such as the app filter a device's zygote makes.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static const int blocked[] = {99, 100, 97, 217, 218, 219, 268, 277, 280, 293, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 159};
#define MAX_ALLOWED 64
#define NBLOCKED (sizeof(blocked) / sizeof(blocked[0]))
static int run_filter_file(const char *path, char **argv) {
static struct sock_filter filter[BPF_MAXINSNS];
FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
if (!f) {
perror("seccomp-sim: -f");
return 2;
}
size_t n = fread(filter, sizeof(filter[0]), BPF_MAXINSNS, f);
int extra = fgetc(f) != EOF;
fclose(f);
if (n == 0 || extra) {
fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: %s holds no filter of at most %d instructions\n", path, BPF_MAXINSNS);
return 2;
}
struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter };
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
perror("seccomp-sim");
return 1;
}
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror("seccomp-sim: exec");
return 127;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-f") == 0) return run_filter_file(argv[2], argv + 3);
int skip[MAX_ALLOWED], nskip = 0, arg = 1;
if (argc > 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-a") == 0) {
for (char *p = argv[2];; p++) {
char *end = NULL;
long nr = strtol(p, &end, 10);
if (end == p || (*end != '\0' && *end != ',') || *p < '0' || *p > '9' ||
nr < 0 || nr > 1023 || nskip == MAX_ALLOWED) {
fprintf(stderr, "seccomp-sim: -a takes up to %d comma-separated system call numbers, not \"%s\"\n", MAX_ALLOWED, argv[2]);
return 2;
}
skip[nskip++] = (int)nr;
if (*end == '\0') break;
p = end;
}
arg = 3;
}
if (arg >= argc) return 2;
struct sock_filter filter[4 + 2 * MAX_ALLOWED + 2 + 2 * NBLOCKED + 1];
int n = 0;
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch));
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 1, 0);
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr));
for (int i = 0; i < nskip; i++) {
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, skip[i], 0, 1);
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
}
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K, 424, 0, 1);
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NBLOCKED; i++) {
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, blocked[i], 0, 1);
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP);
}
filter[n++] = (struct sock_filter)BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW);
struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)n, .filter = filter };
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
perror("seccomp-sim");
return 1;
}
execv(argv[arg], argv + arg);
perror("seccomp-sim: exec");
return 127;
}