# Infrastructure Operating notes for the CoA infrastructure node. Current measured state: [VPS_BASELINE.md](VPS_BASELINE.md). This file never contains private keys, passwords, DB credentials, transfer PINs, API secrets or raw tokens. `` stands for the public IPv4, which is intentionally not stored in git. ## Role `coa-infra-01` (OVHcloud VPS, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS) is the shared infrastructure node for the deployed backend services: ``` Registry API Relay Coordinator PostgreSQL Caddy (ingress) monitoring ``` Phase -1 prepared the host. **Phase 10 deployed the Registry and PostgreSQL** (see [REGISTRY_DEPLOYMENT.md](REGISTRY_DEPLOYMENT.md)); **Phase 12 deployed the Coordinator**; the **Phases 11-12 TLS gate** enabled production HTTPS/WSS ingress; and **Phase 13 deployed the Game Relay**. The VPS is not the source of truth for any player data. Public domain is `coa-manager.duckdns.org` pointing to `coa-infra-01`. Caddy automatically obtains and renews trusted Let's Encrypt TLS certificates via ACME. HTTP on port 80 redirects to HTTPS on port 443. ## Service architecture ``` Internet | 22/tcp -> sshd 80,443/tcp (80 redirects to 443; ACME TLS via Let's Encrypt) v Caddy (container, network coa-ingress) | +--> Registry API (coa-registry:8080, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, no published port) | | | +--> PostgreSQL (coa-postgres:5432, network coa-db only, --internal, no published port) | +--> Coordinator (coa-coordinator:8081, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, no published port) | +--> Game Relay (coa-relay:8082, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, published 40000-43999/tcp) ``` Rules: - PostgreSQL must never be internet-exposed: no `ports:` entry, only on the `coa-db` internal network, no UFW rule for 5432. - Registry (8080), Coordinator (8081), and Relay control HTTP/WS (8082) have no published host ports; they are reverse-proxied exclusively through Caddy. - Game Relay publishes the dedicated TCP port range `40000:43999/tcp` for relayed WoW client game streams (Auth & World). - No admin dashboards or the Docker API on public interfaces. Caddy's admin API is disabled. ## Public surface The public surface of `coa-infra-01` is strictly limited to: | Port | Proto | Service | Access / Security | |---|---|---|---| | 22 | tcp | SSH | Key authentication only (Ed25519), root login disabled | | 80 | tcp | Caddy HTTP | Redirects automatically to HTTPS (`443/tcp`) | | 443 | tcp | Caddy HTTPS / WSS | Reverse proxy for Registry (`/registry/v2/`), Coordinator (`/coord/v1/`), Relay Host WS (`/relay/v1/host`) | | 40000–43999 | tcp | Game Relay | Dynamic TCP port pool for client Auth & World game traffic (dumb byte forwarding) | ## Filesystem layout ``` /opt/coa/ ├── bin/ helper scripts (health.sh) ├── caddy/ compose.yaml, Caddyfile ├── postgres/ compose.yaml (running since Phase 10) ├── registry/ compose.yaml, .env, src/ (the build context of the running image) ├── coordinator/ compose.yaml, src/ ├── relay/ compose.yaml, src/ (coa-relay container) ├── monitoring/ (empty) ├── backups/ 0700, logical dumps and config archives ├── logs/ └── secrets/ 0700 root:root, never in git ``` Config under `/opt/coa/*` is owned by `ubuntu`. Secrets live only in `/opt/coa/secrets` and are referenced from compose files as Docker secrets/files, never inline. ## SSH procedure ```bash ssh ubuntu@ ``` - ED25519 key only; root login and password authentication are disabled (`/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-coa-hardening.conf`). - To change SSH settings: edit the drop-in, run `sudo sshd -t`, `sudo systemctl reload ssh`, and **test from a second terminal before closing the first one**. - Lost key: use the OVH KVM console (or reinstall the VPS with a new key in the OVH reinstall dialog; this wipes data). ## Firewall policy UFW, default deny incoming. Currently allowed: OpenSSH (22/tcp), 80/tcp, 443/tcp, and the Game Relay port pool 40000-43999/tcp. ```bash sudo ufw status verbose ``` Docker-published ports bypass UFW (see VPS_BASELINE.md). Check `sudo docker ps` and `sudo ss -tulnH` after every deployment; the only public listeners must be 22, 80, 443, and Game Relay listeners in 40000–43999/tcp. fail2ban protects SSH (default `sshd` jail): ```bash sudo fail2ban-client status sshd ``` ## Update procedure - Security updates install automatically (unattended-upgrades); no automatic reboot and no release upgrades. - Manual full update (monthly, or after security advisories): ```bash sudo apt update && sudo apt full-upgrade -y test -f /var/run/reboot-required && echo "reboot needed" ``` Reboot with `sudo systemctl reboot` and verify with `/opt/coa/bin/health.sh`. - Containers: pin image tags, then `cd /opt/coa/ && sudo docker compose pull && sudo docker compose up -d`. - Docker Engine updates come through the normal apt repository. ## Health check ```bash /opt/coa/bin/health.sh ``` Shows uptime/load, disk, RAM, listening sockets, failed systemd units, UFW rules, fail2ban SSH bans and running containers. No monitoring stack is installed on purpose (no Grafana/Prometheus until there is a real need). ## Deployment commands ```bash # Caddy (running) cd /opt/coa/caddy && sudo docker compose up -d sudo docker compose logs --tail 50 # PostgreSQL and the Registry (Phase 10): see REGISTRY_DEPLOYMENT.md cd /opt/coa/postgres && sudo docker compose up -d cd /opt/coa/registry && sudo docker compose up -d # Coordinator (Phase 12) cd /opt/coa/coordinator && sudo docker compose up -d ``` ## Backups - Provider backup is not a substitute for application-level backups. What OVH actually includes for this plan (automatic backup, snapshot, KVM/rescue) still has to be confirmed in the Control Panel. - Automated PostgreSQL backup & restore (implemented in Phase 15, Gate 15.5 passed): 1. Logical database backup: `/opt/coa/registry/backup-db.sh` executes `pg_dump --format=custom --blobs` into `/opt/coa/backups`, verifies minimum size (> 1024 bytes), creates `.sha256` checksum file, touches `.complete` atomic marker, and prunes dumps older than 14 days. 2. Database restore: `/opt/coa/registry/restore-db.sh` verifies SHA-256 checksum, terminates existing database connections, and restores cleanly via `pg_restore --clean --if-exists --no-owner`. Disposable test restore verified with 100% table and schema integrity (Gate 15.5). 3. Secrets are backed up separately in `/opt/coa/secrets` (0700 root:root) and never placed in public repositories. - Portable Characters are not backed up here: the VPS is not their source of truth (characters are stored canonically on their respective Owners/Hosts). ## Recovery | Situation | Path | |---|---| | SSH lockout / bad firewall | OVH Control Panel -> VPS -> KVM console, log in locally, fix `ufw`/sshd drop-in | | Broken OS | OVH rescue mode, or Reinstall (Ubuntu 24.04 + pre-installed ED25519 key), then re-apply this document | | Lost VPS | New VPS, follow VPS_BASELINE.md "What was configured", restore config archive and PostgreSQL dump | Reinstall destroys all data on the VPS.