6.2 KiB
Infrastructure
Operating notes for the CoA infrastructure node. Current measured state: VPS_BASELINE.md.
This file never contains private keys, passwords, DB credentials, transfer PINs, API secrets or raw tokens.
<VPS_IP> stands for the public IPv4, which is intentionally not stored in git.
Role
coa-infra-01 (OVHcloud VPS, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS) is the shared infrastructure node for the planned services:
Registry API Relay Coordinator PostgreSQL Caddy (ingress) monitoring
Phase -1 prepared the host. Phase 10 deployed the Registry and PostgreSQL (see REGISTRY_DEPLOYMENT.md); Phase 12 deployed the Coordinator; the Phases 11-12 TLS gate enabled production HTTPS/WSS ingress; and Phase 13 deployed the Game Relay. The VPS is not the source of truth for any player data.
Public domain is coa-manager.duckdns.org pointing to coa-infra-01. Caddy automatically obtains and renews trusted Let's Encrypt TLS certificates via ACME. HTTP on port 80 redirects to HTTPS on port 443.
Service architecture
Internet
|
22/tcp -> sshd
80,443/tcp (80 redirects to 443; ACME TLS via Let's Encrypt)
v
Caddy (container, network coa-ingress)
|
+--> Registry API (coa-registry:8080, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, no published port)
| |
| +--> PostgreSQL (coa-postgres:5432, network coa-db only, --internal, no published port)
|
+--> Coordinator (coa-coordinator:8081, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, no published port)
|
+--> Game Relay (coa-relay:8082, networks coa-ingress + coa-db, published 40000-43999/tcp)
Rules:
- PostgreSQL must never be internet-exposed: no
ports:entry, only on thecoa-dbinternal network, no UFW rule for 5432. - Registry (8080), Coordinator (8081), and Relay control HTTP/WS (8082) have no published host ports; they are reverse-proxied exclusively through Caddy.
- Game Relay publishes the dedicated TCP port range
40000:43999/tcpfor relayed WoW client game streams (Auth & World). - No admin dashboards or the Docker API on public interfaces. Caddy's admin API is disabled.
Public ports
| Port | Proto | Service |
|---|---|---|
| 22 | tcp | SSH, key only |
| 80 | tcp | Caddy HTTP (redirects to HTTPS) |
| 443 | tcp | Caddy HTTPS / WSS |
| 40000-43999 | tcp | Game Relay WoW game traffic (Auth & World) |
Filesystem layout
/opt/coa/
├── bin/ helper scripts (health.sh)
├── caddy/ compose.yaml, Caddyfile
├── postgres/ compose.yaml (running since Phase 10)
├── registry/ compose.yaml, .env, src/ (the build context of the running image)
├── coordinator/ compose.yaml, src/
├── relay/ compose.yaml, src/ (coa-relay container)
├── monitoring/ (empty)
├── backups/ 0700, logical dumps and config archives
├── logs/
└── secrets/ 0700 root:root, never in git
Config under /opt/coa/* is owned by ubuntu. Secrets live only in /opt/coa/secrets and are referenced from
compose files as Docker secrets/files, never inline.
SSH procedure
ssh ubuntu@<VPS_IP>
- ED25519 key only; root login and password authentication are disabled (
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-coa-hardening.conf). - To change SSH settings: edit the drop-in, run
sudo sshd -t,sudo systemctl reload ssh, and test from a second terminal before closing the first one. - Lost key: use the OVH KVM console (or reinstall the VPS with a new key in the OVH reinstall dialog; this wipes data).
Firewall policy
UFW, default deny incoming. Currently allowed: OpenSSH (22/tcp), 80/tcp, 443/tcp, and the Game Relay port pool 40000-43999/tcp.
sudo ufw status verbose
Docker-published ports bypass UFW (see VPS_BASELINE.md). Check sudo docker ps and sudo ss -tulnH after every
deployment; the only public listeners must be 22, 80, 443, and Game Relay listeners in 40000–43999/tcp.
fail2ban protects SSH (default sshd jail):
sudo fail2ban-client status sshd
Update procedure
-
Security updates install automatically (unattended-upgrades); no automatic reboot and no release upgrades.
-
Manual full update (monthly, or after security advisories):
sudo apt update && sudo apt full-upgrade -y test -f /var/run/reboot-required && echo "reboot needed"Reboot with
sudo systemctl rebootand verify with/opt/coa/bin/health.sh. -
Containers: pin image tags, then
cd /opt/coa/<service> && sudo docker compose pull && sudo docker compose up -d. -
Docker Engine updates come through the normal apt repository.
Health check
/opt/coa/bin/health.sh
Shows uptime/load, disk, RAM, listening sockets, failed systemd units, UFW rules, fail2ban SSH bans and running containers. No monitoring stack is installed on purpose (no Grafana/Prometheus until there is a real need).
Deployment commands
# Caddy (running)
cd /opt/coa/caddy && sudo docker compose up -d
sudo docker compose logs --tail 50
# PostgreSQL and the Registry (Phase 10): see REGISTRY_DEPLOYMENT.md
cd /opt/coa/postgres && sudo docker compose up -d
cd /opt/coa/registry && sudo docker compose up -d
# Coordinator (Phase 12)
cd /opt/coa/coordinator && sudo docker compose up -d
Backups
- Provider backup is not a substitute for application-level backups. What OVH actually includes for this plan (automatic backup, snapshot, KVM/rescue) still has to be confirmed in the Control Panel.
- Planned (not implemented yet):
- PostgreSQL logical backup:
pg_dumpto/opt/coa/backups, copied off the node. - Infrastructure config backup:
/opt/coaexceptsecrets/and volumes. - Secrets are backed up separately and never together with the config archive.
- PostgreSQL logical backup:
- Portable Characters are not backed up here: the VPS is not their source of truth.
Recovery
| Situation | Path |
|---|---|
| SSH lockout / bad firewall | OVH Control Panel -> VPS -> KVM console, log in locally, fix ufw/sshd drop-in |
| Broken OS | OVH rescue mode, or Reinstall (Ubuntu 24.04 + pre-installed ED25519 key), then re-apply this document |
| Lost VPS | New VPS, follow VPS_BASELINE.md "What was configured", restore config archive and PostgreSQL dump |
Reinstall destroys all data on the VPS.